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COMPARATIVE ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE
RESOLUTION FOR INDIVIDUAL LABOR
DISPUTES IN JAPAN, CHINA, AND THE
UNITED STATES: LESSONS FROM ASIA?
RONALD C. BROWN†
INTRODUCTION
Resolving individual labor rights disputes in East Asia and
the United States in recent years has taken on new significance
and prominence for both domestic and multinational
corporations.1 New laws and approaches have been put into
place in Japan, China, and the United States that deal with
individual rights under either individual and/or collective
contract or statutory labor disputes. In 2004, Japan passed the
judicial labor tribunal system,2 and in 2007, China implemented
a new mediation and arbitration law,3 each with heralded
success. In 2009, the United States Supreme Court completed its
approval of the use of private arbitration under individual and
collective contracts to resolve both contractual and statutory
labor disputes.4

†

Professor of Law, University of Hawaii Law School, Honolulu, Hawaii.
Labor rights are to be distinguished from labor interests, which are not
discussed in this paper.
2
See Kobetsu funsou kaiketsu sokushin hou [Law on Promoting the Resolution
of Individual Labor Disputes], Law No. 112 of 2001 (Japan), translated at
http://www.jil.go.jp/jil/laborinfo-e/docs/llj_law8.pdf; see also Kazuo Sugeno, The Birth
of the Labor Tribunal System in Japan: A Synthesis of Labor Law Reform and
Judicial Reform, 25 COMP. LAB. L. & POL’Y J. 519, 525 (2004); Takashi Araki,
Establishment of the Labor Tribunal System: Lay Judge Participation in Japanese
Labor Proceedings 6, http://www.j.u-tokyo.ac.jp/~sota/info/Papers/Araki%20Labor%
20Tribunal%20final080907.pdf (last visited Nov. 11, 2012).
3
See Law on Mediation and Arbitration of Labor Disputes (promulgated by the
Standing Comm. Nat’l People’s Congress, Dec. 29, 2007, effective May 1, 2008)
(China), translated at http://tradeinservices.mofcom.gov.cn/en/b/2007-12-29/27880.
shtml; see also RONALD C. BROWN, UNDERSTANDING LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT LAW
IN CHINA 299 (2010).
4
See 14 Penn Plaza LLC v. Pyett, 556 U.S. 247 (2009).
1
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There are common themes and comparative contrasts in the
uses of mediation and arbitration in the approaches of each
country. They may use governmental and/or private structures
to house dispute settlement processes of individual and/or
collective labor disputes, and mediation falls both inside and
outside the arbitration process. There are some interesting
differences, with China and Japan keeping the processes largely
under government regulation and institutions, whereas the U.S.
provides legal authority to privatize much of the labor and
employment law dispute resolution processes. However, in
practice that has not yet been widely implemented, with most
statutory disputes resolved through administrative processes,
and most non-union employment contracts resolved through the
courts.
The processes of resolving labor rights disputes in the U.S.,
China, and Japan, while appearing to use diverse approaches,
actually have common themes, as well as their comparative
contrasts. Understanding their functionalities may present an
opportunity for countries to choose the best practices from among
these processes. This may also afford the many multinational
companies (“MNCs”) and others doing business in these countries
the vantage point of evaluating the different methods of
alternative dispute resolution (“ADR”) processes and keeping the
benefits of in-house mediation processes and their time and costsaving mediation settlements—even while using external
neutrals.
The variables in these ADR procedures include the degree of
governmental regulation, if any, and whether to house the
institutional processes within the government, in the private
sector, or in some combination of the two. ADR procedures vary
on defining “labor disputes” for channeling into specific ADR
processes; they may include individual and/or collective disputes,
which can arise from either or both of contractual—individual or
collective bargaining contracts—and/or statutory labor rights.
The usual mechanisms of mediation, arbitration, and
litigation are employed by all, though in different ways and with
different legal effects. While arbitration decisions may or may
not be legally binding in different settings and in different
countries, mediated settlements almost always are legally
enforceable regardless of when or where they occurred—inside
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the company or in the mediation process preceding an
arbitration, or in or after the arbitration process itself, or in
judicial proceedings before, during, or after any litigation.
Existing mediation and arbitration institutional procedures
each have their own time and cost considerations. This Article
proposes that perhaps consideration of the models of ADR used
in labor disputes in Japan, China, and the U.S. may provide
some guidance in possible redesigning of current ADR systems.
Also, this Article proposes that MNCs consider the advantages of
increased use of meaningful internal mediated settlement
procedures in terms of time, cost, and finality through the
bypassing of outside institutional procedures. Whether they may
legally displace regulatory requirements is another question and
may vary by country and by the final method of settlement.
Employees can also be benefitted when these internal mediation
and arbitration processes contain sufficient due process-like
protections, including an unbiased decisionmaker operating
outside the control of the employer.
I.
A.

OVERVIEW

United States

For individual employees in the U.S., employment contract
disputes have traditionally been taken to the courts to be
resolved.5 For statutory claims, an individual can grieve with a
government administrative agency established to enforce the
particular statute in question, such as the Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”) and the National Labor
Relations Board (“NLRB”).6 In recent years, however, the courts
have allowed employees to accede to employer demands to
contractually substitute a private labor arbitration forum for the
judicial forum on both contractual and statutory claims.7 This

5
See, e.g., Donald J. Farole, Jr., Contract Bench and Jury Trials in State Courts,
2005, BUREAU JUST. STAT. BULL., Sept. 2009, at 1, 1–7, 9–10, 13, available at
http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/content/pub/pdf/cbajtsc05.pdf.
6
Instructions for filing a charge can be found online. See Filing a Charge,
EEOC, www.eeoc.gov/facts/howtofil.html (last modified June 10, 1997); Frequently
Asked Questions, NLRB, https://www.nlrb.gov/faq/nlrb (last visited Nov. 1, 2012).
7
See, e.g., Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20 (1991).
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forecloses the usual path for resolving statutory claims through
the administrative agency forum, as it is bypassed and the court
usually defers to arbitration.
If an individual employee falls under the collective
bargaining contract of a unionized workplace, then overlapping
individual contract rights are replaced by the collective contract
rights.8 Almost always, these collective contracts include private,
non-governmental labor arbitration processes to resolve
individual or group labor disputes arising out of the collective
contract. However, since in the U.S. fewer than ten percent of
private workers are union members, collective labor contract
(“CBK”) arbitration, while very significant—and available to nonmembers under the CBK—does not affect a majority of American
employees in the private sector.9
In addition, courts almost always defer to arbitration awards
under CBKs.10 Likewise, when statutory labor disputes are
included, an appeal of the arbitration award will also be deferred
to by the court.11 In 2009, the U.S. Supreme Court allowed
unions, under a collective contract—like those under an
individual labor contract—to agree to substitute a private labor
arbitration forum for the court forum, foreclosing the usual
administrative review and resulting in court deference to the
arbitration decision.12
8
See J.I. Case Co. v. NLRB, 321 U.S. 332, 334–36 (1944). Currently in the
United States, in the private sector, fewer than ten percent of eligible workers are
union members. Economic News Release, Bureau of Labor Statistics, Union
Members Summary (Jan. 27, 2012) [hereinafter Union Members Summary],
available at www.bls.gov/news.release/union2.nr0.htm.
9
In 2011, 6.9 percent of private workers belonged to unions, while the total
percentage was 11.8 percent with 14.8 million members. Union Members Summary,
supra note 8.
10
Likewise, there often is administrative deferral. For example, the NLRB has a
long-standing policy of deferring to arbitration dealing with the resolution of
pending unfair labor practices that factually overlap with the collective bargaining
agreement if it is adequately resolved by the arbitration process and decision. See
United Techs. Corp., 268 N.L.R.B. 557, 559–60 (1984); Olin Corp., 268 N.L.R.B. 573,
573 (1984).
11
Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 26 (individual employment contract); United Steelworkers
v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574, 578 (1960) (collective bargaining
contract).
12
14 Penn Plaza LLC v. Pyett, 556 U.S. 247 (2009). Currently, such contract
provisions authorizing statutory claims to be arbitrated are not popular with unions
for a number of reasons, including increased responsibilities and liabilities.
Additionally, a bill has been introduced in Congress, the Arbitration Fairness Act
(“AFA”), proposing a law that would amend the Federal Arbitration Act (“FAA”),
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The collective bargaining contract issues arbitrated by
private arbitrators are comprehensive and expansive, ranging
from affirmative action to working conditions. In recent years,
the number of Federal Mediation & Conciliation Service
(“FMCS”)13 labor arbitration panel requests has decreased from
19,023 in 200314 to 16,486 in 2010.15 At the same time that the
number of FMCS panel requests has been decreasing, the
number of collective labor disputes has declined. It decreased
from twenty-two major work stoppages involving 99,600 workers
in 200516 to eleven major work stoppages involving 45,000
workers in 2010.17
In sum, the American system of resolving individual labor
disputes can be identified as having the following general
characteristics:
(1) Individual contractual labor disputes of employees in
the U.S. are typically resolved in the courts, not in
labor arbitration.
(2) Statutory labor disputes in the U.S. are primarily dealt
with by government administrative agencies, with
review by the courts.
(3) Collective contractual labor disputes of individuals in
the U.S., under contracts negotiated by unions, use
non-governmental labor arbitration to resolve labor
disputes over contract interpretations.

9 U.S.C. §§ 1–16 (2006), to prohibit most pre-dispute agreements to arbitrate
employment claims or civil rights claims. Arbitration Fairness Act, S. 931, 111th
Cong. (2009). There also has been a bill in Congress, the Employee Free Choice Act
(“EFCA”), which would enable unions to get bargaining rights through signed
authorization cards rather than a secret-ballot election; it would provide for the
arbitration of first-contract terms if negotiations failed to produce an agreement
after four months. Employee Free Choice Act, S. 560, 111th Cong. (2009).
13
Arbitration Statistics Fiscal Year 2010, FED. MED. & CONCILIATION SERV.,
http://fmcs.gov/assets/files/Arbitration/FY_2010_Statistics/Issues_Arbitrated.doc
(last visited Nov. 1, 2012).
14
Panel Requests by Region, FED. MED. & CONCILIATION SERV. (Oct. 21, 2005),
http://www.fmcs.gov/assets/files/Arbitration/FY2005PanelRequestsbyState.doc.
15
Panel Requests by Region, FED. MED. & CONCILIATION SERV. (Oct. 1, 2010),
http://fmcs.gov/assets/files/Arbitration/FY_2010_Statistics/Panel_Requests_by_State
_2010.doc.
16
News Release, Bureau of Labor Statistics, Major Work Stoppages in 2006,
(Feb. 27, 2007), available at http://www.bls.gov/news.release/archives/wkstp_0227
2007.pdf.
17
News Release, Bureau of Labor Statistics, Major Work Stoppages in 2011,
(Feb. 8, 2011), available at http://www.bls.gov/news.release/pdf/wkstp.pdf.
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(4) U.S. courts permit the substitution of the arbitration
forum for the judicial forum in statutory and
contractual labor rights of employees. While still a
minority view, there is a growing trend in its use,
particularly in individual (rather than collective)
employment contracts.
(5) The U.S. uses both government and non-government
forums to resolve labor disputes depending on whether
the source of the labor right in dispute is contractual
or statutory, and, in the former, usually whether it is
an individual or collective contract.
(6) U.S. courts generally defer to the labor dispute
decisions of labor arbitrators and administrative
agencies.18
B.

China19

China’s labor arbitration system that resolves labor disputes
is much broader and more centralized than the system in the
U.S. In China, except for challenges to bureaucratic decisions—
for example, disputes over the certified percentage of a workrelated injury—most “labor disputes,” contractual and statutory,
arising out of the employment relationship are taken to the
government-provided labor arbitration process.20 Contractual
claims can arise from individual or collective labor contracts.
Labor disputes arising from statutory or contractual bases
are resolved by the labor mediation and arbitration processes.
The mediation process is voluntary, begins within the enterprise,
and involves the union, the employer, and the employee.21
Arbitration is also available, and claims must be filed within
time limits.22 The Labor Mediation and Arbitration Law (“LMA”)
18
An “exception” is illustrated by EEOC decisions that are not deferred to, but
rather given appropriate weight. See Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36,
60 n.21 (1974). Likewise, an arbitration decision will not preclude the EEOC from
prosecuting a case, though the available remedy is affected. See EEOC v. Waffle
House, Inc., 534 U.S. 279, 301 (2002).
19
See BROWN, supra note 3, at 168–83.
20
Law on Mediation and Arbitration of Labor Disputes, supra note 3, art. 2; see
also BROWN, supra note 3, at 168; Labour Arbitration Law Welcome but Systemic
Change, Investment Needed, CHINA LAB. BULL. (Apr. 23, 2008) [hereinafter Labour
Arbitration Law Welcome], http://www.clb.org.hk/en/node/100244.
21
BROWN, supra note 3, at 171–72.
22
The former sixty-day filing deadline was extended to one year. See Law on
Mediation and Arbitration of Labor Disputes, supra note 3; see also BROWN, supra
note 3, at 172–73; Labour Arbitration Law Welcome, supra note 20.
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became effective on May 1, 2008.23
It provides increased
accessibility for employees and greater finality to the arbitration
process.24 It also clarifies the relationship of arbitration awards
to judicial appeal and review.25 Certain exceptions to the usual
requirement of exhaustion of arbitration before judicial review
are now included where more direct access to the court is
permitted.26 The new law has spurred an increased use of
arbitration. For example, many courts and arbitrators handled
more labor disputes in 2009 than a year earlier, after
introduction of rules giving workers more rights and making
arbitration free.27

23
Law on Mediation and Arbitration of Labor Disputes, supra note 3, art. 54; see
also Labour Arbitration Law Welcome, supra note 20.
24
Law on Mediation and Arbitration of Labor Disputes, supra note 3, arts. 47–
50.
25
Id.
26
Id. arts. 16, 29. Expedited access to the courts is possible through Article 44
for certain categories of cases that authorize the arbitration tribunal to send the
decision directly to the court for execution. Id. art. 44.
27
Edward Wong, Global Crisis Adds to Surge of Labor Disputes in Chinese
Courts, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 16, 2010, at A9. Interestingly, in 2010, the number of
arbitrations nationally has leveled off, see id., whereas the number of labor dispute
cases in court has risen. It is reported that “[i]n 2009 labor dispute arbitration
organizations . . . nation-wide handled 875,000 cases. Some 684,000 cases were
accepted for arbitration, a decrease of 1.3 percent compared to the previous year.
The cases involved 1.017 million workers, a decrease of 16.3 percent compared to the
previous year.” China’s Human Resources, GOV.CN, http://www.gov.cn/english/
official/2010-09/10/content_1700448_16.htm (last visited Nov. 1, 2012). Also, it was
reported that in 2008, the courts handled about 286,000 labor dispute cases, an
increase of 94 percent from 2007; whereas the 2009 figure was up to about 317,000
cases. See China’s Labour Dispute Resolution System, CHINA LAB. BULL. (Nov. 26,
2009), available at http://www.clb.org.hk/en/node/100618; Chinese Courts Complete
317,000 Labor Dispute Cases in 2009, CHINA.ORG.CN (Sept. 13, 2010),
http://www.china.org.cn/china/2010-09/13/content_20917787.htm.
Additional
examples in specific areas were reported as follows: “[I]n Jiangsu Province, the total
number of labor disputes heard by Courts at all levels in 2007 was 12,480. This
number increased to 29,862 in 2008, 33,362 in 2009 and 34,111 in 2010. In
Shanghai, the total number of labor disputes heard by the Shanghai No. 2
Intermediate Court in 2010 was 2,607, 17.12% higher than the number in 2009.”
Jonathan M. Isaacs et al., Government Encourages More Mediation in Light of
Drastic Increase in Labor Disputes, CHINA EMP. L. UPDATE, June 2011, at 4, 5,
available
at
http://www.bakermckenzie.com/NLChinaEmploymentLawUpdate
Jun11/ (noting also that pre-2008 statistics of cases filed in arbitration show the
dramatic increase in cases in 2008); see also Number of Cases Accepted by Labour
LAB.
BULL.,
Dispute
Arbitration
Committees
1996–2008,
CHINA
http://www.clb.org.hk/en/files/share/File/statistics/disputes/number_of_disputes_199
6-2008.pdf (last visited Nov. 1, 2012).
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The scope of subjects of labor arbitration is large and
increasing, often varying by region.28 The number of labor
arbitration cases grew from 10,326 in 1989 to about 693,000 in
2008, an increase of more than six thousand percent and an
annual rise of 10.4% from 2006 to 2007 and ninety-eight percent
from 2007 to 2008. 29 In 2007, the 350,182 cases involved 653,472
workers, and in 2008, the 693,000 cases involved 1,200,000
workers.30 In addition, “labor dispute arbitration organizations
at
various
levels
nationwide
handled
875,000
cases . . . involv[ing] 1.017 million workers . . . .”31 At the same
time the number of arbitration cases has been increasing, the
number of collective labor disputes has also increased. It
increased from 15,464 cases in 2006 involving 81,639 workers to
30,385 cases in 2009 involving 68,649 workers.32
In sum, the Chinese system of resolving labor disputes can
be identified as having the following general characteristics:
(1) Individual contractual labor disputes of employees in
China are mostly resolved in labor arbitration within
government administrative agencies, with limited
access to the courts.
(2) Statutory labor disputes in China are mostly resolved
in labor arbitration within government administrative
agencies, with limited access to the courts.

28

RONALD BROWN, FOUND. FOR L., JUST., & SOC’Y, CHINA LABOUR DISPUTE
RESOLUTION 2 [hereinafter CHINA LABOUR DISPUTE RESOLUTION], available at
http://www.fljs.org/uploads/documents/Brown%231%23.pdf.
29
Id. at 3; Number of Cases Accepted by the Labour Dispute Arbitration
Committees 1996–2008, supra note 27.
30
Number of Cases Accepted by the Labour Dispute Arbitration Committees
1996–2008, supra note 27. In view of this increase and the strain it places on the
arbitration tribunals, the Chinese government is proposing an increased use of
mediation. The Ministry of Human Resources and Social Security (“MOHRSS”)
issued the draft Measures Concerning Enterprise Labor Dispute Consultation and
Mediation on June 3, 2010. Isaacs, supra note 27, at 4. Under these measures,
“enterprises that have more than 300 employees shall . . . establish their own labor
dispute mediation committees.” Id. However, currently no penalty is provided for
non-compliance. Id.
31
Info. Office of the State Council of the People’s Republic of China, China’s
REV.
(last
updated
Oct.
13,
2010),
Human
Resources,
BEIJING
http://www.bjreview.com.cn/document/txt/2010-10/13/content_303463_4.htm.
32
CHINA LABOUR DISPUTE RESOLUTION, supra note 28; see also Cheng-Guan
Hwang, Labor-Capital Disputes in Taiwan: Statistics and Handling Mechanism, APIRNET, http://ap-irnet.ilobkk.or.th/resources/labour-dispute-resolution-in-china/at_
download/file3 (last visited Nov. 1, 2012).
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(3) Collective contractual labor disputes of individuals in
China, under contracts negotiated by unions, are
mostly resolved in labor arbitration within
government administrative agencies, with limited
access to the courts.
(4) Mediated settlements occurring before, during, or after
arbitration are common, and courts generally defer to
them.
(5) Chinese courts generally defer to the labor dispute
decisions of labor arbitrators, except in prescribed
areas.
C.

Japan

Individual labor rights disputes arise in many ways,
including from discipline, termination, and contract violations.
They may arise from contractual or statutory labor rights and
may involve an individual or collective labor right. The processes
of dispute resolution in Japan are housed in government
institutions and vary, depending on whether the right is
individual or collective.33 Collective labor disputes are resolved

33
Although an individual covered by a collective bargaining agreement can file a
grievance under its collective contract, as noted in the following comments, it is not a
widely used or effective means of individual ADR for individual labor disputes.
While individual labor grievance-arbitration provisions may be used, see, e.g.,
RENGO Model Contract, labor arbitration must, under law, be advisory only, since
the two options available to an individual are civil proceedings or the Labor
Tribunal. See Makoto Ishida & Ryo Hosokawa, Developments in 2004–Major
Legislation & Treaties: Labor Law, 24 WASEDA BULL. COMP. L. 59, 59–61 (2006),
available at http://www.waseda.jp/hiken/jp/public/bulletin/pdf/24/ronbun/A0285921100-000240059.pdf; see also JAPAN INST. FOR LAB. POL’Y & TRAINING, LABOR
SITUATION IN JAPAN AND ANALYSIS: GENERAL OVERVIEW 2009/2010 104 (2009)
[herinafter LABOR SITUATION IN JAPAN], available at http://www.jil.go.jp/english/
laborsituation/general/2009-2010.html; JAPAN INST. FOR LAB. POL’Y & TRAINING
RES. REP., RESEARCH ON SUPPORT FOR DEVELOPMENT OF IN-HOUSE DISPUTE
SETTLEMENT SYSTEMS (2008), available at www.jil.go.jp/english/reports/documents/
jilpt-research/no.98.pdf; Interview with Judge Kazutaka Tanaka, Labor Tribunal,
Tokyo District Court (Nov. 14, 2010).
Labor conflict resolution machineries have concentrated on collective
dispute settlement in Japan. Grievance procedures stipulated in labor
contracts have not been working effectively. The center of gravity of labormanagement relations has shifted from collective bargaining with labor
unions to individual labor contracts with individual workers both in the
unorganized sector and the non-union members within the organized
sector . . . . Vague demarcation between rights and interest disputes as well
as between collective and individual disputes characterize the dispute
settlement machineries in Japan.
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by the Labor Commission, although individual complaints
arising under the collective agreement may be brought by the
individual in the courts or Labor Tribunal, as described below.34
Kazutoshi Koshiro, Formal and Informal Aspects of Labor Dispute Resolution in
Japan, 22 LAW & POL’Y 353, 353 (2000). Indeed, it is reported that grievance
procedures usually “do not function effectively. Arbitration of individual grievances,
or minor dispute[s] (dispute[s] of rights), [are] almost alien to Japan.” Id. at 355.
Also, “[a]ccording to the Ministry of Labor’s Survey on Labor-Management
Communications in 1999 published in June 2000, only 25.2 percent of the
undertakings surveyed had grievance procedures.” Id. “Only 37.4 percent of the
workers surveyed presented their grievances or complaints to their employers or
supervisors.” Id. “Because of the ineffectiveness of these grievance procedures in
Japan [in 2002], the most important route to resolve labor disputes of rights [was by]
civil lawsuits.” Id. at 358. For law dealing with collective bargaining contract
disputes, see Labor Relations Adjustment Act, Law No. 25 of 1946, art. 29 (Japan),
translated at http://www.jil.go.jp/english/laborinfo/library/documents/llj_law3.pdf,
and Labor Union Act, Law No. 174 of 1949 (Japan), translated at www.jil.go.jp/
english/laborinfo/library/documents/llj_law2.pdf.
34
On occasion, a Prefectural Labor Relations Commission (“LRC”), whose
essential role is to deal with collective disputes, also has authority to conduct
mediation for individual labor disputes (except for in Tokyo, Hyogo, and Fukuoka).
In this case, the panel of mediators is tripartite. See Act on Promoting the
Resolution of Individual Labor-Related Disputes, supra note 2, art. 21. In 2010, the
Central Labor Relations Commission reported the number of conciliation cases of
individual labor disputes by forty-four Prefectural Labour Relations Commissions in
2010 to be 423, decreasing by 111 cases or 20.8% from the previous year. Recent
Statistical Survey Reports, JAPAN INST. FOR LAB. POL’Y & TRAINING (May 2011),
http://www.jil.go.jp/english/estatis/esaikin/2011/e201105.htm.
Collective
labor
disputes, including unfair labor practices, are dealt with by the Labor Commission
(that is, the Japanese “National Labor Relations Board”). Koshiro, supra note 33, at
356–57; see also WILLIAM B. GOULD, JAPAN’S RESHAPING OF AMERICAN LABOR LAW
27 (1984). The Labor Relations Commission is a tripartite system under the Trade
Union Law comprised of commissioners representing the public, employers, and
workers. Araki, supra note 2, at 2. In order to bring a dispute before the
Commission, a union must qualify for recognition under Article 2 of the Trade Union
Law. Labor Union Act, supra note 33, arts. 2, 5. The procedures for the resolution of
collective disputes are set forth in the Labor Relations Adjustment Act, which
emphasizes voluntary settlement of disputes. Labor Relations Adjustment Act,
supra note 33, art. 34. If the Prefectural Labor Relations Commission determines
that an unfair labor practice has occurred, the Commission may issue a remedial
order (such as reinstatement of an employee, ordering an employer to bargain in
good faith, et cetera). Japan’s Labour Relations Commission System, MINISTRY OF
HEALTH, LAB. & WELFARE, http://www.mhlw.go.jp/english/org/policy/dl/08.pdf (last
visited Nov. 1, 2012). An employer may appeal the order of a Prefectural Labor
Relations Committee to the Central Labor Commission or seek judicial review. Id.
Mediation and conciliation results may be rejected by the parties. Id. Arbitration
awards are binding. Id; see Labor Relations Adjustment Act, supra note 33, art. 34;
KAZUO SUGENO, JAPANESE EMPLOYMENT AND LABOR LAW 554 (Leo Kanowitz trans.,
2002). The reference to “binding” relates only to collective disputes under the Trade
Union Law, as individual labor disputes can be taken to the courts and its Labor
Tribunal, where arbitration is binding only upon mutual agreement of the parties.
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As to resolving disputes over individual labor rights, there
are several alternatives available. First, an individual can claim
a violation with the Labor Administration Offices and seek
resolution by adjustment or conciliation or mediation. Second, a
complaint can be resolved by the court in a regular civil
procedure presided over by a judge. Or third, since 2006, a
complaint can be filed with the court, and a procedure for the
appointment of a Labor Tribunal Panel can be initiated that
utilizes mediation and non-binding arbitration to resolve the
dispute.35 If the Tribunal does not resolve the dispute, the case
can proceed to the court’s usual civil process.36
1.

Overview of Labor Dispute Resolution System
FIGURE 1:
OVERVIEW OF LABOR DISPUTE RESOLUTION SYSTEM37

35
36
37

See Araki, supra note 2, at 2–3.
Id. at 10.
Id. at 2.
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Labor administration offices are available for alleged
violations of individual labor rights (employment law). The
prefectural Labor Offices, which are the local offices of the
Ministry of Health, Labor and Welfare, provide counseling
and mediation services on labor issues.38 “Since the Labor Offices
launched such services, the number of complaints received by
the Labor Offices has also been increased annually . . . .”39 The
issues involved in individual labor disputes are comprehensive,
ranging from wage increases to objections to the discontinuance,
shutdown, or contraction of a business.40 The total number of
labor consultations grew from 824,000 in 2004 to 1,141,000 in
2009, while the number of individual labor and management
dispute consultations also grew from 160,000 in 2004 to 247,000
in 2009.41

38

Id. at 6.
Id.
40
JAPAN INST. FOR LABOR POL’Y & TRAINING, JAPANESE WORKING LIFE
2010/2011—LABOR
STATISTICS
74–75
(2010),
available
at
PROFILE
http://www.jil.go.jp/english/workinglifeprofile/2010-2011/all.pdf.
41
Id. at 74. Labor consultations included termination (24.5%), change of work
conditions (13.5%), bullying and harassment (12.7%), inducements toward
retirement (9.4%), and recruitment and hiring (1.1%). Id. Labor disputes by
principal demands in 2008 included objections to discharge or issues of
reinstatement (173), wage increases (111), temporary allowance (99), and revision of
working hours (8). Id. at 75. The Individual Labor Dispute Solution System is based
on the 2001 Act on Promoting the Resolution of Individual Labor-Related Disputes.
It clarifies the jurisdictional application of the later law and states:
Article 3[:] The Director of the Prefectural Labor Bureau, in order to
prevent the occurrence of individual labor-related disputes, and to promote
the voluntary resolution of individual labor-related disputes, shall provide
workers, job applicants and business operators with information on matters
concerning labor relationships and matters concerning the recruitment and
employment of workers and give consultations and other assistance.
....
Article 5[:] In a case where one or both parties (hereinafter referred to as
“disputing parties”) to an individual labor-related dispute set forth in
paragraph 1 of the preceding article (except disputes with respect to a
matters [sic] concerning the recruitment and employment of workers) files
an application for mediation with respect to said individual labor-related
dispute, if the Director of the Prefectural Labor Bureau finds it necessary
for the resolution of said individual labor-related dispute, the Director shall
have the Dispute Coordinating Committee conduct mediation.
Act on Promoting the Resolution of Individual Labor-Related Disputes, supra note 2,
arts. 3, 5.
39

FINAL_Brown (Do Not Delete)

2012]

2/21/2013 12:13 PM

LESSONS FROM ASIA?

555

At the same time that the number of consultations has been
increasing, the number of collective labor disputes has declined.
It decreased from 118 disputes in 2000 involving 15,000 workers
to 52 disputes involving 8,300 workers in 2008.42
When there is a possible violation of employment law, the
Labor Office will refer the matter to the Labor Standards
Inspection Office for further investigation, which may in turn
either issue a notice of recommendation—usually a request for an
apology or other minor remedial action—to the respondent on
behalf of the complainant, or refer the complainant and
respondent to the Dispute Adjustment Commission for
mediation/conciliation.43 “The Dispute Adjustment Committee
can provide a mediation proposal but it is up to the parties
whether or not to accept it.”44 The parties are free to pursue
remedies in the court in a de novo hearing.45

42
JAPAN INST. FOR LABOR POL’Y & TRAINING, DATABOOK OF INTERNATIONAL
LABOUR STATISTICS 2011 209–10 (2011), available at http://www.jil.go.jp/kokunai/
statistics/databook/2011/07/p209-210_t7-3.pdf.
43
Sugeno, supra note 2.
44
Araki, supra note 2. The Dispute Adjustment Commission is comprised of
three to twelve commissioners serving two-year terms, part-time. Law on Promoting
the Resolution of Individual Labour Disputes, supra note 2, arts. 6–8. Mediators are
typically practicing lawyers and law professors. Sugeno, supra note 2. In 2003, out of
approximately 170,000 consultation cases handled by all of the national labor offices,
about 4,500 were resolved with notices of recommendation and 5,000 cases were
mediated. Sugeno, supra note 2, at 525–26. In 2008, 8,457 applications for mediation
were received, and procedures were completed for 7,920. State of the Operation of
Individual Labour Dispute Solution System, MINISTRY OF HEALTH, LAB., &
WELFARE, available at http://www.mhlw.go.jp/english/wp/wp-hw3/dl/4-43.pdf.
Agreement was reached in 2,647 cases, 4,654 were discontinued, and 587 had the
applications withdrawn. Id. On occasion, a Prefectural Labor Relations Commission,
whose essential role is to deal with collective disputes, also conducts mediation for
individual labor disputes (except for Tokyo, Hyogo, and Fukuoka). In this case, the
panel of mediators is tripartite. See Act on Promoting the Resolution of Individual
Labor-Related Disputes, supra note 2, art. 12.
45
Outline of Civil Litigation in Japan, SUPREME COURT OF JAPAN,
http://www.courts.go.jp/english/proceedings/civil_suit_index/civil_suit/index.html#i
(last visited Nov. 1, 2012) (explaining the Code of Civil Procedure of 1996).
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Labor Administration Offices
FIGURE 2:
INDIVIDUAL LABOR DISPUTE SOLUTION SYSTEM46

46

The Outline Chart of Individual Labour Dispute Solution System, MINISTRY
HEALTH, LAB. & WELFARE, http://www.mhlw.go.jp/english/wp/wp-hw3/dl/4-42.pdf
(last visited Nov. 1, 2012).
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FIGURE 3:
STATE OF THE OPERATION OF INDIVIDUAL LABOR DISPUTE
SOLUTION SYSTEM47

47
State of the Operation of Individual Labour Dispute Solution System, supra
note 44.
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Courts and Labor Tribunal System48

In addition to and without prior administrative conciliation
or mediation, an individual worker may proceed in district court
with a civil claim under a labor statute or contract, individual or
collective.49 In 2008 and 2009, 4,493 and 6,686 labor cases,
respectively, were filed in civil court, including 2,441 and 3,218
cases, respectively, proceeding in the Labor Tribunal.50 Since the
effective date of 2006, workers may choose to take the case to
court and first utilize the Labor Tribunal System that employs
mediation and arbitration procedures in attempts to bring the
parties to settlement.51 It has a very high success rate: As of
2009, 3,500 cases per year were filed with the Tribunal, with two
and one-half months being the average duration for the
procedures and eighty percent of the filed cases being settled.52
Typical disputes covered under the courts and the labor tribunals
involve “disputes over rights between individual employees and
employers,”53 such as “dismissals, job changes, pay claims,
retirement allowance claims, disciplinary actions and the
48
See generally Katsutoshi Kezuka, Significance and Tasks Involved in
Establishment of a Labor Tribunal System, 3 JAPAN LAB. REV. 13 (2006), available at
http://www.jil.go.jp/english/JLR/documents/2006/JLR09_Kezuka.pdf.
49
The process is as follows:
The employee files a complaint with the District Court as a court of first
instance. Each District Court has jurisdiction over a region which in
general corresponds to the given prefecture. Cases at the District Court are
presided over by a single judge but may be heard by a panel of three equal
judges, if it decides that the gravity of the case warrants it. The losing
party in the first instance may appeal (Koso) the judgement [sic] of the
District Court to a High Court. There are 8 High Courts in Japan, each
with an [sic] own territorial jurisdiction. The court of appeal inquires into
the fact [sic] and law once more and decides in a panel of three judges. The
party dissatisfied with the High Court’s judgement [sic] may appeal
(Jokoku) to the Supreme Court as the court of last resort but needs to
succeed [on] the procedure of admission first, since the Supreme Court can
refuse the appeal in view of a lack of importance. In the Supreme Court,
the case is usually heard by the Petty Bench consisting of 5 judges.
Liliane Jung, National Labour Law Profile: Japan, INT’L LAB. ORG. (June 17, 2011),
http://www.ilo.org/ifpdial/information-resources/national-labour-law-profiles/WCMS_
158904/lang--en/index.htm.
50
Takashi Araki, Japan’s Labor Tribunal System Established in 2006:
From “Precise-Justice” To “Resolution-Oriented Justice”? (Univ. of Tokyo),
http://isllss.huji.ac.il/110106Final%20Jerusalem(Araki).ppt (last visited Nov. 1,
2012).
51
Id.
52
Id.
53
Ishida & Hosokawa, supra note 33, at 62.
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working condition changes.”54 In addition, “when disputes occur
over the rights of individual employees concerning
discrimination, changes of working conditions and layoffs,” the
labor tribunal has jurisdiction over the individual’s dispute,
“even if it is a group dispute.”55
Upon hearing the complaint, the district court organizes a
labor tribunal composed of a career judge, a representative from
labor, and a representative from management.56 Labor and
management representatives are appointed to the district court
on a part-time basis for a two-year term before they are assigned
to individual cases.57 The tribunal sends a copy of the complaint
to the respondent and notifies both parties of their appearance
date.58 Proceedings are informal and generally not open to the
public.59 To limit the time to a final decision, hearings are
limited to three sessions intended to take no more than three to
four months from start to finish.60 At the third session, the
tribunal will propose a settlement.61 If either party rejects this,
the tribunal will issue a decision.62 If neither party rejects the
decision or if they mutually accept it, the decision becomes
binding.63 If both parties reject the decision, it is not binding and
the matter will be returned to the district court where the parties
may continue with civil litigation if so desired.64

54

Id.
Id. at 63.
56
See Sugeno, supra note 2, at 530.
The Labor Tribunal Committee (LTC), thus, comprises one professional
judge and two lay members, both of whom are experts in labor relations.
Although these two experts are recommended by Rengo (Japanese Trade
Union Confederation) and Nippon Keidanren (Japan Business Federation),
in practice, they must be fair and impartial in the handling of the case.
These experts participate in decision making on equal footing with the
professional judge member.
Araki, supra note 2, at 9–10.
57
Law on Promoting the Resolution of Individual Labor Disputes, supra note 2,
art. 8; Sugeno, supra note 2, at 530.
58
Sugeno, supra note 2, at 530.
59
Araki, supra note 2, at 8.
60
Id.
61
Id. at 14.
62
Id.
63
Id. at 10.
64
SUGENO, supra note 34, at 681; Araki, supra note 2, at 10. From April 2006 to
March 2007 “nearly 80%” of the cases filed with the Labor Tribunals “were resolved
through the Labor Tribunal procedures.” Id. at 11 (citing Akihiko Ohtake, Kaishi-go
1 nen wo heta Rodo Shinpan Seido no Genjo to Kadai [The Current Situation and
55
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FIGURE 4:
OVERVIEW OF THE LABOR TRIBUNAL SYSTEM65

Future Issues after One Year Operation of the Labor Tribunal System] 217 KIKAN
RODO-HO 53 (2007)). Likewise, this high percentage of case resolution at 80% or
above continued through 2009. Employment Litigation in Japan, ORRICK,
www.orrick.com/fileupload/3716.pdf (last visited Nov. 1, 2012). See generally LABOR
SITUATION IN JAPAN, supra note 33, at 99–107.
65
Araki, supra note 2, at 9 fig.6.
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In sum, the Japanese system of resolving individual labor
disputes can be identified as having the following general
characteristics:
(1) Individual contractual labor disputes of employees in
Japan can be ultimately resolved in the courts or in
the court’s Labor Tribunal System.
(2) Statutory labor disputes in Japan are primarily dealt
with by government labor administration offices, in
the courts, or in the court’s Labor Tribunal System.
(3) Individual labor disputes arising under collective
contracts negotiated by unions can have the individual
labor dispute rights resolved by courts or in Labor
Tribunals.
(4) Mediation is used by the administration labor offices
and the Labor Tribunal to permit mediated
settlements for the individual labor rights of
employees. A high percentage of cases heard in the
Labor Tribunal result in successfully mediated
settlements.66 Japanese courts generally honor and
defer to the mediated settlements arising from the
labor administration offices and the Labor Tribunals
and to the agreed-upon arbitrations of the Labor
Tribunals.
II. COMPARING CHARACTERISTICS OF THE U.S., CHINA, AND
JAPAN IN RESOLVING INDIVIDUAL LABOR DISPUTES
A.

Venue: Government or Private?

In the U.S., the primary venue for resolving individuals’
contractual employment disputes traditionally has been the
courts, though for unionized workers—a small percentage of the
work force—the private arbitration venue is used. A small
percentage of cases, but growing, percentage of cases use private
arbitration in individual employment agreements.67

66

See Araki, supra note 2, at 11.
See John-Paul Alexandrowicz, A Comparative Analysis of the Law Regulating
Employment Arbitration Agreements in the United States and Canada, 23 COMP.
LAB. L. & POL’Y J. 1007, 1009 (2002).
67
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For disputes under labor statutes, the primary avenue for
resolution is the use of labor administrative agencies.68 There is
a small but growing trend to consensually agree to substitute
private arbitration for administrative agencies and the courts,
but this approach is not yet in wide use.69
In China, labor dispute resolution is institutionalized by the
government, with most labor disputes, contractual and statutory,
resolved in the government-provided mediation-arbitration
system, though a significant number still reach and are resolved
in the courts.70
In Japan, workers may seek to consult over labor disputes or
resolve statutory labor disputes with a labor administrative
agency or with the courts or within the court’s labor tribunals.71
Likewise, workers may also bring contractual—as well as
statutory—employment labor disputes directly to the courts
and/or its labor tribunals; these can include individual labor
rights arising under a collective bargaining agreement.72
B.

Source of Labor Disputes

As discussed above, the type of labor dispute controls the
available avenues for resolution of the labor dispute. Individual
employment contracts are dealt with by courts or government
institutions in the U.S., China, and Japan, albeit with some use
of private arbitration in the U.S. in individual employment
agreements and in unionized settings, where private arbitration
is the norm.73
Statutory labor disputes of individuals may be resolved, in
the first instance, by government administrative agencies in the
U.S., Japan (labor administration offices), and China (in labor
arbitration commissions).74 Alternatively, in Japan, these may
be resolved in the first instance by the courts or by labor

68

See, e.g., Filing a Charge, supra note 6.
See Kia C. Franklin, The Injustice of Private Arbitration, WASH. POST, Apr.
21, 2008, at A14; see also Ross Runkel, Arbitration of Employment Disputes: The
New Privatization of the Judicial System, LAWMEMO (Apr. 1, 2004),
http://www.lawmemo.com/articles/arb.htm.
70
See supra notes 20–27 and accompanying text.
71
See supra notes 33–34 and accompanying text.
72
See supra notes 33–36 and accompanying text.
73
See supra notes 5, 7, 20, 33–34 and accompanying text.
74
See supra notes 11, 20, 34 and accompanying text.
69
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tribunals.75 In the U.S., there is also a small but growing use of
private arbitration being voluntarily substituted for the
administrative and judicial processes.76
C.

Mediation Processes

Mediation is a widely used approach in each country’s
handling of labor disputes, including in the courts. In the U.S.,
China, and Japan, it may begin in variant forms within
companies—possibly through the use of committees—that
operate more like negotiations or conciliation between or among
In
the parties seeking accommodations and settlements.77
unionized settings, mediation is provided in coordination with
the union, often in the preliminary steps of the grievance
arbitration procedures.78 Otherwise, it is a procedure established
by the employer on a non-mandatory basis seeking to encourage
accommodations and settlements. In China, this process is
available intra-company on a voluntary basis.79 In all settings, it
makes sense in the context of human resource management to
have a system such as mediation to defuse and possibly resolve
labor disputes.
Institutionalized mediation procedures (and/or conciliation)
outside any employer procedures, are available in each country,
though to varying extents. Government-provided mediation
services are available in Japan in all forums—the
administration labor agency, courts, and labor tribunals. As
discussed above, the percentage of mediated settlements in the
Labor Tribunal has been exceptionally high, at eighty percent.80

75

See Koshiro, supra note 33, at 356.
See supra text accompanying note 7.
77
See, e.g., Susan K. Hippensteele, Revisiting the Promise of Mediation for
Employment Discrimination Claims, 9 PEPP. DISP. RESOL. L.J. 211, 232 (2009);
Hilary K. Josephs, Measuring Progress Under China’s Labor Law: Goals, Processes,
Outcomes, 30 COMP. LAB. L. & POL’Y J. 373, 385 n.68 (2009); Kristina T. Geraghty,
Note, Taming the Paper Tiger: A Comparative Approach to Reforming Japanese
Gender Equality Laws, 41 CORNELL INT’L L.J. 503, 511 (2008).
78
See, e.g., ADVISORY, CONCILIATION & ARBITRATION SERV., MEDIATION: A
GUIDE FOR TRADE UNION REPRESENTATIVES 3, 8 (2010), available at
http://www.acas.org.uk/media/pdf/m/7/Acas_TUC_Mediation_Guide_AUGUST_2010
_(Final).pdf.
79
CHINA LABOUR DISPUTE RESOLUTION, supra note 28, at 3.
80
Araki, supra note 2, at 11.
76
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Likewise, in China, the use and success of mediation and
mediated settlements is high, and it is used extensively in
arbitration, as well as in the courts.81
In the U.S., mediation is available but infrequently employed
in individual employment contract disputes.82 For statutory labor
disputes, conciliation is used extensively in the procedures of
administrative agencies prior to appeals for post-decision,
judicial determination.83 Courts also use mediation.84
D. Arbitration Processes
In the U.S., labor arbitration of contract labor disputes is a
creature of contract, wherein the employer and worker may
voluntarily enter into an agreement to resolve workplace labor
disputes through private arbitration. These agreements are
enforceable by the courts, which generally defer to the parties’
choice of forum and the decision therein.85
Arbitration decisions generally are not overruled unless they
are determined by the courts to be against public policy or there
is a significant flaw in the arbitration process; this is so even
where the court may not agree with the merits of the decision.86
In the case of arbitration of individual labor disputes, the clear
trend of the courts is to more closely scrutinize the fairness of the
arbitration process.87
81
In 2006, over ninety percent of the cases in mediation/arbitration were
resolved. See BROWN, supra note 3, at 172, 173 tbl.14.1. In litigation, employees
prevailed in over one half of the cases in 2005. Id. at 180.
82
In unionized settings, the U.S. government makes available the Federal
Mediation Conciliation Services (“FMCS”) to help resolve labor interest disputes.
“[T]he core mission of FMCS has been, and remains, to assist labor and management
to settle their disputes through mediation . . . .” Carolyn Brommer et al., Cooperative
Bargaining Styles at FMCS: A Movement Toward Choices, 2 PEPP. DISP. RESOL. L.J.
465, 465 (2002). See generally 29 U.S.C. §§ 172–173 (2006) (authorizing FMCS);
Richard Barnes, FMCS on the Cutting Edge, 2 PEPP. DISP. RESOL. L.J. 321 (2002)
(discussing in detail the history and current state of FMCS). FMCS also
provides a list of potential private arbitrators that the parties may voluntarily
utilize. Arbitration FAQs, FED. MEDIATION & CONCILIATION SERV.,
http://www.fmcs.gov/internet/faq.asp?categoryID=133&itemID=16546#Q16529 (last
visited Nov. 7, 2012).
83
See supra Part B.1.
84
See supra Part C.1.
85
See, e.g., NLRB v. Plasterers’ Local Union No. 79, 404 U.S. 116, 133 (1971).
86
FRANK ELKOURI & EDNA ASPER ELKOURI, HOW ARBITRATION WORKS 46 (Alan
Miles Ruben ed., 6th ed. 2003).
87
See, e.g., Plasterers’ Local, 404 U.S. at 133. However, a recent U.S. Supreme
Court decision in AT&T Mobility, LLC. v. Concepcion held that a California
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In China, the arbitration is regulated by the government,
though designated arbitrators may be government or nongovernment employees.88 A labor tribunal is established and, if

unconscionability law banning class waivers in contracts of adhesion could be used
to avoid the enforcement of an arbitration provision in a cell phone contract
containing such a waiver. 131 S. Ct. 1740, 1748–53 (2011). The Supreme Court
found that, in this instance, the Federal Arbitration Act preempted California
contract law. Id. at 1753. Some have concerns this ruling could limit the courts’
ability to supervise labor and employment arbitration agreements for
unconscionability and fairness. The ABA’s Section on Labor and Employment has
noted:
Concepcion applies only to arbitration subject to the FAA; it does not apply
to arbitration agreements construed in state courts (for example, when the
underlying claims do not present a basis for federal jurisdiction). State
courts remain free to apply state law unconscionability principles to
arbitration clauses that are challenged in state court litigation, and they
frequently do so. See, e.g.Muhammad [sic] v. County Bank of Rehoboth
Beach, 189 N.J. 1, 912 A.2d 88 (N.J. 2006), and Kinkel v. Cingular Wireless
LLC, 223 Ill. 2d 1, 857 N.E.2d 250 (Ill. 2006).
. . . Concepcion is limited to situations where the FAA preempts state law.
To the extent federal common law includes the principles of
unconscionability of contracts—and courts have suggested as much in other
contexts[,] [ ]see, e.g., Operating Engineers Local 39 Health Benefit Fund. v.
Gustafson Constr. Co., 258 F3d. 645, 655 (7th Cir. 2001); Husman Constr.
Co. v. Purolator Courier Corp., 832 F.3d 459, 461 (8th Cir. 1987), and
Fairfield Mfg. Co., Inc. v. Hartman, 132 F.Supp.2d 1142 (N.D. Ind. 2001)—
Concepcion may not insulate an arbitration clause from an
unconscionability challenge. Such a challenge may be difficult, of course, in
light of: (i) Concepcion’s strong language that arbitration clauses are to be
enforced as agreed upon, and (ii) Concepcion’s rejection of arguments that
consumers should be protected from adhesion contracts. In any event, if
Congress passes legislation defining the role of arbitration in consumer and
employment disputes, the state law preemption analysis from Concepcion
could fall by the wayside.
AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion et ux., No. 09-893, Argued November 9, 2010,
Decided April 27, 2011, AM. BAR ASSOC., http://www.americanbar.org/content/
newsletter/groups/labor_law/ll_hottopics/2011_aball_hottopics/11_aball_att_concepci
on.html (last visited Nov. 8, 2012).
In the United States, there are institutional codes of conduct and procedures
provided by the FMCS and the American Arbitration Association for the arbitrators
to follow in those cases where the parties have chosen to utilize arbitrators from a
list provided by them. Employment Due Process Protocol, AM. ARB. ASS’N, INC.
(2011), available at http://www.adr.org/aaa/ShowPDF?url=/cs/groups/lee/documents/
document/mdaw/mdaz/~edisp/adrstg_004368.pdf; see also Little v. Auto Stiegler,
Inc., 63 P.3d 979 (Cal. 2003) (discussing whether an arbitration clause is
unconscionable); Richard A. Bales, The Employment Due Process Protocol at Ten:
Twenty Unresolved Issues, and a Focus on Conflicts of Interest, 21 OHIO ST. J. DISP.
RESOL. 165, 171–72 (2005).
88
BROWN, supra note 3, at 173–75.
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mediation fails, a binding arbitration decision may be made.89
There are prescribed rules for arbitration procedures.90
In Japan, private arbitration is the exception. However, the
court’s Labor Tribunal uses arbitration with procedures, though
its decision is enforceable only if the parties agree to it or fail to
reject it within time limits.91
An interesting comparative aspect of the use of arbitration in
China, Japan, and the U.S. is the role and background of the
arbitrators. They may be private or governmental in Japan,
China, and the U.S.92 How they are selected and trained (or not),
or whether they have a code of ethics, are all variables to
consider in the assessment of the integrity of the process.
E.

Legal Effect of Mediation Settlements and Arbitration
Decisions

In the U.S., mediation agreements entered into by the
parties are treated as settlements, which are binding contracts;
likewise, arbitration decisions are typically binding and
enforceable by the courts. Some limited exceptions that permit
the setting aside of decisions exist in cases of corruption, clear
conflicts of interest by the arbitrator, or decisions found to be
against public policy.93

89
See id. at 179 & nn.70–71; Law on Mediation and Arbitration of Labor
Disputes, supra note 3, arts. 5, 14, 42, 47.
90
BROWN, supra note 3, at 302–305.
91
See Araki, supra note 2, at 10.
92
In the United States, to be listed as an arbitrator with the Federal Mediation
Conciliation Service you must meet the following qualifications: “(1) [Be]
experienced, competent and acceptable in decision-making roles in the resolution of
labor relations disputes; or (2) Ha[ve] extensive and recent experience in relevant
positions in collective bargaining; and (3) [Be] capable of conducting an orderly
hearing, [be able to] analyze testimony and exhibits and [be able to] prepare clear
and concise findings and awards within reasonable time limits.” Becoming an FMCS
Arbitrator, FED. MEDIATION & CONCILIATION SERV., http://www.fmcs.gov/internet/
itemDetail.asp?categoryID=184&itemID=16436 (last visited Nov. 8, 2012). In China,
you can be appointed by the government, but the law sets forth the following
qualifications: (1) former judge; (2) research or teaching in the area; (3) knowledge or
experience in human resource management; or, (4) lawyer for three years. BROWN,
supra note 3, at 303.
93
See Michael H. LeRoy & Peter Feuille, Judicial Enforcement of Predispute
Arbitration Agreements: Back to the Future, 18 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 249, 262
& n.79 (2003); see also Eric Sposito, Judicial Standards for Enforcement and
Vacatur of Labor Arbitration Awards, 7 RUTGERS CONFLICT RESOL. L.J. 1, 6, 18–19
(2009).
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In China, mediation agreements entered into by the parties
within any of the forums—in-house, arbitration, or courts—are
legally enforceable by the courts. Most arbitration decisions are
directly enforceable by the courts. However, certain categories of
cases may be taken to the court for consideration. In those cases,
the arbitration decisions are not binding without court
determination.94
In Japan, mediation agreements have “the same effects as
the compromises which are made in and authorized by the
court.”95 Thus, “a formal court-connected mediation [conciliation]
agreement . . . has the same effect as an absolute judgment.”96 In
the absence of a mediated agreement, the labor dispute
determination committee or the judge makes a determination
“[that] loses its effect” if a party “file[s] an objection to [that]
decision within two weeks.”97 If no such objection to the
settlement is filed, then that determination is legally enforceable,
similar to a judicial settlement.98
III. MULTI-NATIONAL COMPANIES AND ADR
Multi-national companies usually do not provide nor utilize
traditional employee grievance procedures that end in a thirdparty decision that finally settles an employment dispute.
Rather, absent a collective bargaining contract with its grievance
procedures, these companies must rely on the availability of local
laws and procedures. Somewhat frequently, internal procedures
may be provided, most often designed to expose violations of
standards or law rather than resolve them, under the clear
auspices of the employer that then determines the final outcome.
Internal mediation also may be available.
Below are illustrations of International Labour Organization
(“ILO”) principles, SA8000 standards and procedures, and Nike
provisions used for its contractors—not its employees.

94

These include appeals by the workers. BROWN, supra note 3, at 178.
Ishida & Hosokawa, supra note 33, at 62.
96
Katja Funken, Comparative Dispute Management: Court-Connected Mediation
in Japan and Germany, 3 GERMAN L.J. ¶ 23 (2002), available at
http://www.germanlawjournal.com/index.php?pageID=11&artID=130.
97
See Outline of Civil Litigation in Japan, supra note 45.
98
Id.
95
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ILO Tripartite Declaration of Principles Concerning
Multinational Enterprises and Social Policy
Multinational as well as national enterprises jointly with the
representatives and organizations of the workers whom they
employ should seek to establish voluntary conciliation
machinery, appropriate to national conditions, which may
include provisions for voluntary arbitration, to assist in the
prevention and settlement of industrial disputes between
employers and workers. The voluntary conciliation machinery
should include equal representation of employers and workers.99

B.

SA8000 Standards100

The Standards provide guidance on workers’ rights to a
representative to present the workers’ position on employment
issues, on eliminating discrimination, and on proper discipline
and corrective action.101 For example, see below:
99
Codes of Conduct for Multinationals, ACTRAV-TURIN LAB. EDUC. PROGRAM,
http://actrav.itcilo.org/actrav-english/telearn/global/ilo/guide/main.htm#Summ (last
visited Nov. 8, 2012).
100
SA8000 Standards and Procedures utilize an externally-monitored system,
are voluntary, and most often are used by contractors to become “eligible” for an
award
of
a
MNC
contract.
See
SA
8000
Procedures,
http://qualitymanagement.hrvinet.com/saQUALITYMANAGEMENT.HRVINET.COM,
8000-procedures/ (last visited Nov. 8, 2012); SA 8000 Standards,
http://qualitymanagement.hrvinet.com/saQUALITYMANAGEMENT.HRVINET.COM,
8000-standard/ (last visited Nov. 8, 2012); see also Michael J. Hiscox et al.,
Evaluating the Impact of SA8000 Certification, in SOCIAL ACCOUNTABILITY 8000:
THE FIRST DECADE—IMPLEMENTATION, INFLUENCE, AND IMPACT 147, 147 (Deborah
Leipziger
ed.,
2009),
available
at
http://www.people.hbs.edu/mtoffel/
publications/HiscoxSchwartzToffel2009.pdf.
101
SA8000 Worker Representative:
9.3 The company shall recognize that workplace dialogue is a key
component of social accountability and ensure that all workers have the
right to representation to facilitate communication with senior
management in matters relating to SA8000. In unionised facilities, such
representation shall be undertaken by recognized trade union(s).
Elsewhere, workers may elect a SA8000 worker representative from among
themselves for this purpose. In no circumstances, shall the SA8000 worker
representative be seen as a substitute for trade union representation.
SOC. ACCOUNTABILITY INT’L, SOCIAL ACCOUNTABILITY 8000 8 (2008), available at
http://www.sa-intl.org/_data/n_0001/resources/live/2008StdEnglishFinal.pdf.
More specific standards provide:
5. Discrimination rules in SA 8000
The company shall not engage in or support discrimination in hiring,
remuneration, access to training, promotion, termination or retirement
based on race, caste, national origin, religion, disability, gender, sexual
orientation, union membership, political affiliation, or age.
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15. Addressing Concerns and Taking Corrective Action: The
company shall investigate, address, and respond to the concerns
of employees and other interested parties with regard to
conformance/non-conformance with the company’s policy and/or
the requirements of this standard; the company shall refrain
from disciplining, dismissing or otherwise discriminating
against any employee for providing information concerning
observance of the standard.102

SA8000 provides pertinent implementing procedures, as well
as standards. Its procedures are focused on ADR within the
enterprise.103

....
7. Disciplinary practices in SA 8000
The company shall not engage in or support the use of corporal
punishment, mental or physical coercion, and verbal abuse.
....
15. Addressing Concerns and Taking Corrective Action
The company shall investigate, address, and respond to the concerns of
employees and other interested parties with regard to conformance/nonconformance with the company’s policy and/or the requirements of this
standard; the company shall refrain from disciplining, dismissing or
otherwise discriminating against any employee for providing information
concerning observance of the standard.
SA 8000 Standards, supra note 100.
102
SA 8000 Standards, supra note 100.
103
Id.
Reviewing procedure for complaint and discipline
1. PURPOSE:
To examine and give complaint about the implementation of discipline on
employee and to protect the employee’s right as regulated by laws about
exposing and complaining.
2. SCOPE:
This procedure applies to the examination of discipline implementation and
complaint in the company.
....
4. CONTENT:
4.1. Examine the implementation of discipline:
4.1.1. All the violations of regulation of the company are recorded as form
No: 0012. The recorder has responsibility to note down all the violation
content and asked [sic] related parties to sign. If the violator refuses to
sign, write down the reasons.
4.1.2. The violation record will be sent to the head of the division where the
violator works in [sic] to commend (if have) and forward to the
Administrative Department for solving.
4.1.3. The violator has responsibility to make a statement about what
happened, give the divisional head to commend and then send to the
Administrative Department.
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Nike ADR Provisions in Its Code of Conduct for
Contractors104
6. EFFECTIVE GRIEVANCE PROCESS
The contractor shall establish an effective grievance process
that enables employees to address their concerns regarding
working conditions and terms and conditions of employment.
The specific grievance process will vary from factory to factory
depending upon its size, local laws, culture, etc. But in general,
an effective grievance process includes:

4.1.4. This Department has responsibility to collect all the opinion [sic],
evaluate the violation[,] then invite the violator and related parties to come
to discuss about [sic] the problem.
4.1.5. This department has responsibility to write down the solving
opinions and present to the Board for considering and deciding. Then, it
has to send the decision to the violator within 2 days since the decision is
made.
4.1.6. If the problem is too serious and complex, the administrative
department makes a report and present [sic] to the General Director for
approval to organize a meeting to discuss about [sic] the problem.
Attendants are: [t]he General Director or the representative, [l]abor union
representative, head of [a]dministrative department, violator, and
deponent (if have), defendant (if have) and the representative of people who
made the report.
4.1.7. The decision to dismiss the employee of labor union must have
opinion [sic] from the Union chairman and from the higher level Labor
Union (if the violator is the union chairman).
4.2. Complain and consider implementing the discipline
The complaint period is 15 days since the violator receives the decision.
When receiving complaint, [t]he Administrative Department will invite the
board representative (one person), [A]dministrative [D]epartment (one
person), violator’s divisional head (one person), and [l]abor union
representative (one person) and make a meditation board. Invite the
violator as well as the deponent to the meeting and ask for their opinion.
This board makes a [sic] successful or unsuccessful mediation minutes.
This [sic] minutes will be kept along with the case record. After that, the
claimant may send another complaint to the Labor Union, Labor
office . . . to solve if not satisfied.
Reviewing
Procedure
For
Complaint
And
Discipline,
QUALITYMANAGEMENT.HRVINET.COM,
http://qualitymanagement.hrvinet.com/reviewing-procedure-for-complaint-anddiscipline/ (last visited Nov. 8, 2012).
104
Note that these provisions are used for Nike’s contractors—not its employees.
NIKE INC., NIKE CODE LEADERSHIP STANDARDS (2011), available at
http://nikeinc.com/system/assets/6276/Nike_Code_Leadership_Standards_Jan2012_o
riginal.pdf?1325287549. Nike employees have their own standards with violations
enforced by the employer. See generally NIKE, INC., INSIDE THE LINES: THE NIKE
CODE OF ETHICS (2008), available at http://phx.corporate-ir.net/External.File?item=
UGFyZW50SUQ9MTkyfENoaWxkSUQ9LTF8VHlwZT0z&t=1.
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a. A written grievance policy and implementing procedures.
The policy should include. [sic]
i. Multiple channels for employees to raise concerns and provide
input to management.
For example: grievance/suggestion
boxes; supervisors/team leaders; HR department/counselors;
trade union/worker representatives; “open door” policy;
company “hotlines”; third-parties, worker committees, meetings
between management and worker’s representatives, etc; and
ii. The ability to raise concerns confidentially (or anonymously),
subject to the requirements of country law, if the employee so
desires without fear of retaliation.
b. Effective communication of the grievance policy to employees
so that employees are aware of the grievance process and their
right to raise concerns.
c. Training of staff responsible for responding to grievances
regarding the policy and their roles and responsibilities; and
d. A means to document and track grievances to ensure there is
a timely response back to the employee.

IV. COMMON THEMES AND COMPARATIVE CONTRASTS
Common themes are found in each country’s approach to
resolving individual labor disputes. Mediation, occasionally
conciliation, arbitration, and litigation are used by all, though at
times placed in different ADR forums and utilized by differently
trained personnel. Also, government regulatory frameworks and
a government forum are most often used to bring and resolve
labor claims. Most provide multiple avenues in seeking redress,
often distinguishing between labor rights originating in contract
or statute.
Comparative contrasts are highlighted by China’s “one-stop”
forum for resolving labor claims using mediation and arbitration
and Japan’s successful Labor Tribunal System used by its courts.
By contrast, the U.S., except in the case of collective bargaining
contracts, traditionally uses the courts in individual employment
contract disputes and the administrative processes for statutory
claims, with the right of judicial review. The latter requires
using a particular administrative agency, among many, and its
procedures and methods of ADR. Private arbitration is used
where there is a collective bargaining contract or an individual
agreement between the employee and the employer to use the
arbitration forum. The U.S. Supreme Court also has sanctioned
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the use of private arbitration for resolving both individual and
collective statutory labor rights, though at this time it is not
widely utilized.
While each country uses mediation in resolving labor
disputes, unsuccessful mediation in the initial steps in the U.S.,
China, or Japan does not foreclose further steps in ADR. In fact,
in most cases the next step in redressing employee claims, again,
is the mediation process in a different forum. For example, in
the transition from the administrative process to the judicial
process, the judges will first try mediation.
In Japan,
unsuccessful mediation in the Labor Tribunal will lead to a nonbinding, recommendatory arbitration decision to which the
parties must agree, or else it moves on to court procedures, which
itself may first utilize mediation.
The finality of arbitration decisions varies. For example, the
last step in Japan’s Labor Tribunal System is a recommendatory
settlement (non-binding arbitration?): If not accepted, it moves
into the court proceedings for adjudication. China, like the U.S.,
has a system of finality for most cases, but court enforcement
may be required; and, in China’s case, there may be court
jurisdiction for a certain limited number of categories.
The MNCs, thus far, have not generally embraced traditional
private, internal grievance procedures for their employees’ labor
claims, though there is a hint that there may be some to come,
especially the use of mediation, even including external
mediation.105 Rather, the MNCs rely on local laws and practices
in resolving employee grievances where normal discussions or
internal mechanisms under the employer’s control do not produce
resolution.

105
Some small experimentation project is taking place in China using law
students as the external mediators.
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FIGURE 5:
ADR PROCESSES: COMMON THEMES AND COMPARATIVE
CONTRASTS OF INDIVIDUAL LABOR RIGHTS

V.

LESSONS AND QUESTIONS?

Certainly, comparative study of other country’s approaches
can provide ideas for rethinking and perhaps redesigning
approaches in one’s own country. Is there a “best approach” for
ADR to resolve employment disputes—one that can serve as a
model or a guide for a country or an MNC?
In the search for the best approach, an old idea of a “labor
court” in the U.S. might resurface. These courts would combine
the many labor laws and their multiple administrative ADR
approaches under a common umbrella with the same general
procedures used for resolving the disputes, whether they
originate in contract or statute—perhaps a super agency—housed
in either an administrative or judicial forum. Or, in the U.S.,
after the Supreme Court in 14 Penn Plaza authorized the private
arbitration model for labor contracts and statutory rights
disputes, could the private arbitration system be a model?
The rethinking could benefit from knowing that the
Japanese Labor Tribunal System has been very successful within
the Japanese culture, which values mediation. Though housed in
the court, it also utilizes non-judges in its mediation and
recommendatory arbitration decisions. Japan also provides a
worker-friendly “one stop” consultation and mediation agency to
deal with the myriad of worker employment-related
complaints.106
106

As discussed in above text (with chart and statistics), employees can go to the
agency instead of going to all the various agencies as is done in the United States.
The alternative is to go to court.
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The Chinese labor arbitration system offers employers and
employees a single institution to resolve most employment
disputes.
It also can and does utilize non-government
arbitrators.
In the U.S., private arbitration is highly touted and prized,
and authorized for use by the U.S. Supreme Court.107 How
devastating would it be to house or regulate an arbitration
system under a more government-regulated system of
procedures, possibly paralleling the sets of rules of the private
American Arbitration Association and/or the government’s
FMCS? Could there be government institutions with expanded
jurisdiction using “private” arbitrators (like the FMCS?), or
private arbitration with “government” arbitrators or governmentregulated arbitrators?
Debate and evaluation could be the possible advantages of a
government-housed, “single court/tribunal.”
The increased
efficiency and possible cost savings in replacing some of the
functions of overlapping administrative agencies would need to
be balanced against the possible loss in expertise in subject
matters and in statutory balances, though perhaps the impact is
less in contract disputes where judges accept every type of
employment contract matter.108
Complementary to the above is to consider increased
emphasis on meaningful, non-employer-dominated internal
procedures used by employers to address the inevitable labor
disputes and to diminish the use of the typical legal ADR
processes. Advantages to employers, including MNCs, of using
internal, private ADR procedures that might use expert external
mediators would be to substitute this process for the external
administrative and judicial procedures with their inevitable
attendant vagaries and delays. On the other hand, an argument
can be made that the expertise and legal institutional structures
which use mediation are already in place and available, so why
duplicate them with a private system? And should statutory
labor rights really be privatized?
107
Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 25–26 (1991);
Alexandrowicz, supra note 67, at 1041.
108
Could the functions of the U.S. agencies’ approach of using rule-making and
providing “guidelines” be consolidated, eliminated, or replaced with “adjudication”
as, to some extent, is the practice with the NLRB? Could it make sense to re-locate a
consulting/advising/conciliating function into a “one-stop shop,” with specialized
departments, as is done in Japan?
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For the MNCs and likely most employers, the reality is that
they are quite resistant to any voluntary procedure that causes
relinquishment of control over their employees.
Thus,
mediation—utilizing
external
mediators—rather
than
arbitration, could be a viable alternative to dealing with
employees’ labor disputes, perhaps depending on the cost factor.
Currently, there is some experimentation underway in China
utilizing this approach.109
In the final analysis, the “take away” from understanding
the ADR approaches of Japan, China, and the U.S. might be to
think of ways to improve present systems. Perhaps “borrowing”
and “learning” from other countries’ experiences and creating
“something new”: the perennial, “better mouse trap?”
The MNCs—and employers generally—might find that a
modest relinquishment of authority over labor dispute settlement
by utilizing more mediation can have positive effects on employee
morale,
human
resource
management
practices,
and
productivity. Likewise, consideration could be given to whether
there might be sufficient advantages in utilizing more arbitration
processes: the binding and private U.S. model, the
recommendatory and governmental Japanese model, or the
binding and governmental Chinese model. MNCs should also
consider whether the utilized mediation and arbitration
provisions should embrace all individual labor disputes, only
contractual disputes, or only statutory disputes.
If an American group of academics, legislators, practitioners
of law and industrial relations were tasked to consider possible
reconfiguration of the best system of individual labor dispute
resolution for the most workers, with due consideration of
management’s interests, and excluding political considerations,
what recommendations would likely be made? Drawing upon the
international experiences in Japan and China, and the new
authority in the U.S. for “privatizing” the arbitration of labor
disputes, which dominant themes for reform, if any, would
emerge and what recommendations could be predicted,
considering a labor court, an industrial tribunal, private or
government decisionmakers, binding or recommendatory
decisions, status quo, et cetera?

109

See supra note 105 and accompanying text.
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Some private experiments in ADR are already underway, for
example with former Chair of the NLRB, William B. Gould IV,
serving as an independent monitor selected by an
internationally-based employer, FirstGroup, to investigate and
recommend remedies for alleged individual labor rights in the
workplace tailored to labor relations.110 Perhaps other privately110
William B. Gould IV, Using an Independent Monitor To Resolve UnionOrganizing Disputes Outside the NLRB: The FirstGroup Experience, 66 DISP. RESOL.
J. 46, 48 (2011). In 2007, FirstGroup purchased Laidlaw International, Inc. for $3.6
billion. Id. at 50. Laidlaw was the largest operator of yellow school buses, “making
First Group America’s school bus unit (First Student) the leading student
transportation provider in North America, serving more than 1,500 school districts
with more than 60,000 buses.” Id. “The deal also increased operations at the transit
management unit (First Transit), which employs 15,500 people and operates 7,000
buses out of 235 locations in 41 states, Canada and Puerto Rico.” Id. The author
wrote of the “Independent Monitor Program:”
Facing an aggressive union organizing campaign at its U.S. subsidiary, a
multi-national company implemented an unprecedented ADR program to
address complaints that management violated the company’s corporate
social responsibility policy and its commitment to the right of employees to
associate with a union. The program, known as the Independent Monitor[,]
could be a model for other companies.
....
Complaints needed to be submitted within 60 days of the alleged violation,
and submitting a complaint did not affect the right to file a ULP charge or
to complain to any public agency.
....
After the investigation . . . the investigator prepared a preliminary report
for the Independent Monitor that laid out the facts of the case . . . . If the
Independent Monitor found a violation of the FoA Policy, he made
recommendations for actions to be taken by the company to cure the
violation.
The company had to decide how to respond to the Independent Monitor’s
recommendations. It did not have to accept any recommendations. Within
30 days it could adopt, reject, or modify them. It could decide to accept some
recommendations and reject the rest from the same report. To provide
transparency, the company would send its response to the report to both
the Independent Monitor and the complaining party.
....
During the IM Program’s three-year tenure, the Independent Monitor
received complaints alleging 372 violations of the FoA Policy and issued
143 written reports. Complaints alleged, among other things, that a
manager or supervisor discriminated against an employee based on union
activity, made anti-union comments, enforced overly broad no talking,
solicitation, and distribution rules, or prohibited the wearing of union
insignia.
Of the 372 alleged violations, 32 were withdrawn prior to the issuance of
a report, and 72 were found to be outside the jurisdiction of the
Independent Monitor because they asserted general workplace grievances
that did not involve union activity, or were not filed within 60 days of the
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based experiments, including employers’ internal third-party
monitoring system procedures such as those just described, or
use of other third-party monitoring programs like SA8000 for
example, could lead to broader reforms?

incident, as required by the program. In those instances, the Independent
Monitor informed the complaining party of the company’s confidential
employee hotline.
....
Slightly over one-half of the complaints were filed by employees while the
rest were filed mainly by unions. Five complaints were referred to the
program directly by the company.
....
Complaints were promptly investigated and reported on within 45 days, on
average, and 85% of the cases were completed in less than 90 days.
Id. at 46, 53.

